Bureaucracy change

One of the first steps in the reform of the bureaucracy by the government should be an end to job extensions to civilian bureaucrats. This is an incentive to make them malleable to the pressures of the party in power. It also enables dithering in decision-making so that errors of commission are eliminated. This system of rewards in the form of governorships, staff cars and State-subsidised bungalows in Lutyen’s Delhi must end.
One solution is to divide jobs between regulators and line appointments. On reaching at the age of 55, the bureaucracy should be asked to choose between the two careers. Those interested in regulation should be allowed to continue till 65 years while other follow the direct line operations till 60 or, in exceptional cases, 62 years.
The next step that needs to be taken is to consider three batches of civil services at one go for a better choice of officers at the joint secretary level and remove the deadwood on the basis of non-selection in three years. Given that some secretary-level jobs require a high degree of skill and technical expertise like in the areas of nuclear, climate change, civil aviation, cyber security, counter-terrorism, power and defence acquisition, the government should look at filling these posts through lateral entries. It could look at filling 25%of the requirement from the private sector at the level of additional secretary and above. For the bureaucracy to perform, bona fide mistakes must be condoned, and merit, initiative and hard work rewarded with important assignments overlooking any political considerations. Wearing one’s honesty on one’s sleeve alone cannot be the sole criterion of suitability. A bureaucrat is expected to be honest. This cannot be used as a justification to delay decision-making as is seen to be done by officials serving in defence. This sector is the key to the flagship ‘Make in India’ programme, and the finance ministry.
The government also needs to energise internal security by first injecting fresh blood into the intelligence agencies at the senior level and then getting them on the same page by breaking existing silos. Intelligence agencies have been largely reduced to dumping grounds for officers from politically uncomfortable postings at the state level and who have sought central jobs.
This has meant that accountability is often judged by the number of security alerts issued on a given day. While one acknowledges the supreme sacrifices made by the men and women of the Indian armed forces particularly the Indian Army, there must be strong accountability at the leadership level so that the country is not taken by surprise as in the 1962 China war or 1999 in Kargil.
Visionary military leadership seems to be missing in the field as well as in innovation. This has meant a distinct lack in producing India-specific doctrines. Nearly 69 years after Independence, the government and in-house strategists are still grappling with short- and long-term objectives on our neighbours, particularly Pakistan. The Indian growth story is promising. But the government can capitalise on it only by making the bureaucracy more effective in the speedy implementation of its policies. The argument that the CBI, the CVC or the CAG prohibits effective decision-making by civil servants is a self-defeating one. This let down the UPA-2 regime. The NDA should learn from those mistakes. more